Ontological Relativism and the Pragmatic Notion of Metaphysical Truth :: Philosophy Metaphysics Research

Ontological Relativism and the Pragmatic Notion of Metaphysical Truth ABSTRACT: I. Introduction The mind body problem resembles a black hole in the universe of philosophy: It takes a lot of energy which could be spent otherwise. Therefore, it would be liberating to show that it is not a problem at all. That is exactly what I shall do in this paper. Roughly, I shall argue as follows: First, I will show that the traditional mind body problem as a logical conflict will not occur if one is more decided in dualism. Then, I shall argue that dualism does not need to be an absurd position. It is absurd only when taken metaphysically, but it is plausible when taken pragmatically. I shall reject the metaphysical presumptions shared by metaphysical dualism and the materialist identity theory in order to develop a metaphysical position compatible with pragmatic dualism. Thus, I shall get rid of the mind body problem, the absurdities associated with dualism and the unintelligibility of the identity theory — all at once. II. Exchanging Logical Conflicts for Metaphysical Questions The traditional logical way of putting the mind body problem is this: (1) Physical events are caused only by other physical events. (2) Mental phenomena play causal roles such that they do cause not only other mental phenomena but also physical events, namely actions and movements. (3) Mental phenomena are not physical. These statements contradict each other, but only for the reason that (3) defends a mental-physical dualism, whereas (2) supposes identity between actions (or behavior) and phyical events. Thus, the logical conflict is constituted by nothing but indecision in dualism. I call it indecision, because the relevant reasons which lead to dualism with regard to mental and physical phenomena do equally well support dualism as to actions (or behavior) and physical events. Both variants of ontological dualism are built upon semantic dualism which is both conceptual and explanatory dualism. As to conceptual dualism, it should be conceded that mental phenomena, behavior, and actions as such can be individuated only as sensed, had, made, and done by someone. This existential dependency on a subject cannot be analysed naturalistically, because it is neither an empirical intrinsic property, nor any kind of empirical relation. It is what the contents of the concepts "sensing", "feeling", "deciding", "believing", and "acting" have in common, concepts, which do not refer to intrinsic properties or relations at all. Thus, the individuation of mental phenomena and actions as such differs essentially from the individuation of physical phenomena and events.